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6 BEFORE THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER
7 OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

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9 In the Matter of the Application regarding
10 the Conversion and Acquisition of Control of
11 Premera Blue Cross and its Affiliates

NO. G02-45

HOSPITAL ASSOCIATIONS’
SUPPLEMENT TO JOINT REPLY
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
INTERVENE

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13 In accordance with the Commissioner’s Case Management Order of October 24,
14 2002, the Washington State Hospital Association (“WSHA”) and the Association of
15 Washington Public Hospital Districts (“AWPHD”) (hereinafter “the hospital associations”)
16 submit this individual supplement to the Joint Reply to OIC Staff Response and Premera
17 Opposition to Motions to Intervene.
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19 **I. Introduction & Summary**

20 The Commissioner’s staff has taken the position that intervention status should be
21 granted to the hospital associations and others, but suggests that the Commissioner impose
22 a number of restrictions on the intervenors. Premera, consistent with its previous attempts
23 to minimize scrutiny of the proposed conversion, argues that none of the proposed
24 intervenors should be allowed to participate in the adjudicatory hearing. The hospital
25 associations will address Premera’s arguments first, and will show that they are based on a
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1 misreading of the applicable statutes, and a series of unsupported assumptions about the
2 intervenors' intent and the ability of the Commissioner to manage the proceedings. We
3 will then address the staff's suggested restrictions on the intervenors, and will show that
4 while the hospital associations remain committed to efficient proceedings and cooperation
5 with provider groups and other applicant-intervenors wherever possible, the requested
6 restrictions are premature, and in some respects unworkable.

7 8 **II. Response to Premera**

9 **A. Premera has created criteria for intervention not found in the applicable 10 statutes.**

11 Premera's principal argument is that, in order to grant intervenor status, the
12 Commissioner must find that a movant's interest is "different from that of the public in
13 general and is [not] already represented by the public agencies such as the OIC and
14 Attorney General." Premera Opp. at 3. This standard, which is expressly rejected by the
15 Commission staff (OIC Staff's Response at 12), has no basis in the applicable statutes.
16 The only requirements for intervention under RCW Chapters 48.31B and 48.31C are that
17 the intervenor has a "significant interest" that is "determined by the commissioner to be
18 affected." RCW 48.31B.015(b) and RCW 48.31C.030(4). The acts grant such a person the
19 right to "present evidence, examine and cross-examine witnesses, and offer oral and
20 written arguments, and in connection therewith may conduct discovery proceedings in the
21 same manner as is allowed in the superior courts of this state." *Id.*

23 Because these proceedings are subject to Title IV of the Administrative Procedure
24 Act, RCW 34.05.443(1) also applies, although this general statute cannot be applied so as
25 to nullify the specific provisions of the Holding Company Acts. *General Tel. Co. of*
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1 *Northwest, Inc. v. Utilities & Transp. Comm’n*, 104 Wn.2d 460, 464, (1985). Under the
2 APA, the Commissioner is to consider whether intervention is in the interests of justice and
3 will impair the conduct of the proceedings. In the Holding Company Acts, the legislature
4 has already determined that it is in the public interest for persons whose significant
5 interests may be affected by the proposed conversion to be allowed to intervene.
6 Therefore, the only additional criterion imposed by the APA is whether intervention will
7 impair the orderly and prompt conduct of the proceedings.
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9 The latter criterion cannot be read to mean that intervention should be denied if the
10 participation of additional parties will complicate or delay resolution of the matter in any
11 fashion. If that were the standard, intervention would never be allowed. Rather, the
12 Commissioner should consider the inherent complexity of the case, the magnitude of the
13 intervenors’ interests, the likely affect of intervention, and the ability to minimize
14 complications and delay through case management techniques.
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16 Premera’s reliance on UTC’s decision in *In re US West Communications, Inc.*, No
17 UT 951425, 1997 Wash. UTC Lexis 26 (1997), is misplaced simply because that matter
18 did not involve application of the same statutory criteria as are applicable here under the
19 Holding Company and Health Carrier Acts. Similarly, the Wisconsin OIC’s unpublished
20 oral ruling applied general standing principles under its APA—which even Premera
21 acknowledges to not apply to these motions¹—rather than the specific statutory criteria
22 provided under Washington law. *See* <http://oci.wi.gov/bcbsconv/ah112999.pdf> (visited
23 12/14/02). Furthermore, Premera has neglected to mention that, subsequent to this oral
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25 ¹ See Premera Opp. at 38.
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1 ruling, the Wisconsin Commissioner allowed the intervenors in that matter to file briefs,
2 cross-examine and present witnesses at the adjudication, as well as granted discovery of
3 the Commissioner's consultants. *In the Matter of the Application for Conversion of Blue*
4 *Cross & Blue Shield United of Wisconsin*, Wisconsin OIC No. 99-C26038, Findings of
5 Fact, Conclusions of Law & Order (available at <http://oci.wi.gov/bcbsconv/bcbsdec.pdf>)
6 (visited 12/16/02).

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8 **B. The Hospital Associations have significant interests that are affected by these**
9 **proceedings.**

10 The interests of the hospital associations, which are affected by these proceedings,
11 have been described in detail in earlier filings. To summarize, hospital association
12 members are both major providers of health care to Premera subscribers and purchasers of
13 health insurance. If, as is being studied by the Commission staff, the profit motive would
14 result in higher premiums, decreased reimbursements, and withdrawal from less profitable
15 markets or lines, hospitals would be significantly affected. Reduced payments, increases
16 in uncompensated care, or increased health insurance costs will jeopardize the financial
17 viability of hospitals and, in turn, have negative effects on health care consumers.

18 In addition, Premera's stated reason for conversion is increased access to capital,
19 which would likely fund further expansion. If this initiative results in further consolidation
20 of the health care insurance market, the anti-competitive effects of consolidation will be
21 felt directly by hospitals and other providers. Finally, many member hospitals may have
22 corporate rights that will be impaired if the proposed conversion is approved.² It is
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25 ² The hospital associations agree with Premera that the dispute over the validity of Premera's by-law
26 amendments is a matter for the courts and is not part of these proceedings. Assuming (as is likely) that
hospitals seek judicial relief, that would not diminish their interests in this proceeding as described above.

1 difficult to imagine any organizations, other than the company and its subscribers, whose
2 interests are more significantly at stake in these proceedings.

3 For the most part, Premera does not contest the proposition that these interests will
4 be affected by the outcome of these proceedings. Instead, it relies on the erroneous
5 proposition that it is sufficient to say that these interests will be adequately protected by the
6 OIC staff. As demonstrated above, this argument is legally and factually³ unsupported.
7 Additionally, Premera characterizes the hospitals' interests as "special," rather than
8 "significant," and then assumes, without explanation, that this semantic distinction is a
9 sufficient basis to deny intervention. Premera Opp. at 28.⁴

11 In making this argument, Premera poses an irrelevant question and then answers it.
12 The relevant point is that, regardless of whether the hospitals' interests are "special," they
13 are also "significant," both in terms of the statutory criteria that the Commissioner is
14 required to consider and the potential impact on hospitals. If conversion decreases the
15 availability or leads to higher cost of health care coverage (RCW
16 48.31C.030(5)(a)(ii)(B)(II) and RCW 48.31C.030), or is otherwise prejudicial to the
17 insurance-buying public (RCW 48.31C.030(5)(a)(ii)(C)(IV), there will be a direct negative
18 effect on hospitals as a result of increases in uncompensated care and increased costs of
19 insurance for employees. If conversion will lead to consolidation or monopolization of the
20 health insurance market (RCW 48.31C.030(5)(a)(ii), hospitals will suffer in terms of
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23 ³ The staff does not claim to protect the interests of hospitals. *See* OIC Staff Resp. at 12.

24 ⁴ The single case Premera cites in support of this argument, *Cole v. Washington Utilities & Transp. Comm'n*,
25 79 Wn.2d 302, 485 P.2d 71 (1971) is of no help. It involved application of an entirely different statutory test
26 and stands for nothing more than the proposition that a party who is not a customer of the regulated entity
and does not otherwise have a substantial interest in a UTC proceeding does not have a right to intervene
under the UTC's rules. 79 Wn.2d at 305-06.

1 decreased reimbursements, reduced bargaining power and increased premiums. In
2 addition, if conversion is approved but does not result in transfer of 100% of the net asset
3 value of not-for-profit Premera to a organization having a substantially similar purpose,
4 hospitals will be affected because assets that would otherwise have been devoted to
5 providing health insurance on a not-for-profit basis will have been diverted to the for-profit
6 entity, or to an entity not having a substantially similar purpose.⁵
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8 **C. Premera’s “chaos” claim is unfounded.**

9 Relying on RCW 34.05.443(1), Premera argues that participation by the intervenors
10 would “invite chaos.” Premera Opp. at 41. This claim is unfounded. The hospital
11 associations will not create chaos, nor do they believe that any other proposed intervenor
12 has such a goal. Equally unfounded is the underlying assumption that each of the proposed
13 intervenors has unlimited interest, ability and resources to pursue every issue bearing on
14 conversion. The simple economics of this effort require that the intervenors narrowly focus
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18 ⁵ Despite the fact that the issue of compliance with RCW 24.03.225-230 is not before the Commissioner,
19 Premera has devoted considerable attention to denying that it is a not-for-profit corporation with a charitable
20 purpose. This denial is clearly intended to avoid application of the requirements of RCW 24.03.225 and
21 common law that the “assets” of a dissolved charitable corporation must be distributed to another not-for-
22 profit organization with a “substantially similar” purpose. Premera’s stock-transfer scheme clearly fails this
requirement because it would leave the assets in the hands of a for-profit corporation. The stock would not
be convertible to 100% of the asset value because, by the time it could be sold, the new for-profit entity will
have diluted its value by issuance of additional stock.

23 Under RCW 24.03.230, approval of the Attorney General is required only as a condition of adoption of a
24 plan for distribution of the assets of a not-for-profit corporation which is subject to RCW 24.03.225(3), *i.e.* if
25 it has “charitable, religious, eleemosynary, benevolent, educational or similar purposes.” Approval of the
26 Attorney General is not required under any other circumstance. *Id.* Because Premera clearly does not have a
religious or educational purpose, and because “eleemosynary,” and “benevolent” are synonyms for
“charitable,” it is clear that Premera is, or at least must be viewed as, a corporation with a “charitable”
purpose under RCW 24.03.225(3). Having sought AG approval under RCW 24.03.230, Premera is estopped
to deny that it is subject to requirements pertaining to charitable corporations.

1 their efforts. The intervenors have already shown that they are willing to coordinate
2 efforts, eliminate redundant efforts and minimize costs.

3 Premera also assumes that the Commissioner, and the legal staff, would be
4 incapable of exercising control over the intervenors. The record to date belies this
5 assertion. Intervenors have been directly responsive to concerns expressed by the staff
6 about redundant efforts and have committed to minimize the same. The intervenors also
7 acknowledge that the Commissioner is authorized to impose reasonable and appropriate
8 limits on their participation.
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10 **III. Response to OIC Staff**

11 The staff has proposed several very significant conditions on the intervenors'
12 participation, which are discussed specifically below. In general, the hospital associations
13 believe that these conditions are premature and potentially unnecessary because the
14 parameters of this proceeding are not clear. Until the consultant reports are issued and the
15 position of the OIC staff is known, it is impossible to know to what extent the hospital
16 associations will be obliged to participate in the actual hearing, including what experts or
17 other evidence they may wish to present. Similarly, until they know whether, or to what
18 extent, they will be allowed access to the materials being considered by the staff and
19 consultants,⁶ it is impossible for the hospital associations to say what additional discovery
20 they will need.
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23 Therefore, while the hospital associations assert their right to full participation in
24 the adjudication, as the Holding Company acts provide, that does not mean that they will
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26 ⁶ The hospital associations will agree to imposition of a reasonable protective order with respect to such materials.

1 not agree to reasonable conditions on their participation, or that such conditions cannot be
2 imposed later. Therefore, rather than impose a set of unnecessary restrictions at this point,
3 the Commissioner should grant intervention, and then (as the staff suggests) direct the
4 intervenors to meet and confer with the parties to develop a plan for efficient management
5 of the proceeding. If any party or intervenor is dissatisfied with the results of that process,
6 the Commissioner would be in a position to resolve that particular issue, rather than
7 impose broad-brush restrictions.
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9 **A. Creation of a single “Provider Group”**

10 The staff argues that the intervenors should be divided into two groups and that
11 each group should be required to designate one “attorney-in charge.” This condition is
12 unnecessary and unworkable. The hospital associations, the WSMA, the Community and
13 Migrant Health Clinics, and the University of Washington School of Medicine each has
14 separate counsel. Premera has already accused WSMA of violating anti-trust laws in its
15 approach to this case. Premera has also suggested that the hospital associations and other
16 providers seek access to proprietary information, not for purposes of meaningful
17 participation in these proceedings, but for their own self-interests. It further implies it may
18 make antitrust allegations against provider groups in the future. See Premera Opp. at 34.
19 This situation makes it effectively impossible for the two major provider groups to be
20 represented by a single lawyer or law firm. The proposal is also unworkable because it
21 does not account for conflicts of interest engendered by joint representation, which are
22 prohibited by the Rules of Professional Conduct, nor does it account for the economic
23 realities facing the proposed intervenors.
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1 The Commissioner's acknowledged authority to limit multiple examination,
2 redundant presentation of witnesses and to otherwise manage discovery and the hearing is
3 more than sufficient to address the staff's concerns. Requiring the intervenors to give up
4 representation by their counsel of choice is not reasonable nor permitted under these
5 circumstances.

6 **B. Proposed Limits on Depositions and Interrogatories**

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8 The staff's alternative suggestion that "all parties" be limited to taking depositions
9 upon written motion and showing of good cause would unnecessarily burden the
10 Commissioner and the parties. A more sensible approach is to allow a party to object to
11 the taking of any deposition, so that the Commissioner will only have to resolve matters
12 truly in dispute.

13 The proposed 25 interrogatory limit may, or may not, make sense depending on the
14 level of investigation previously undertaken by the staff and the access intervenors are
15 given to that information. This issue would best be resolved after the parties and the
16 intervenors have more information about the parameters of the proceeding.

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18 **IV. Conclusion**

19 For the foregoing reasons, WSHA and AWPHD's Motion to Intervene
20 should be granted. Hospital associations and other applicant-interveners have
21 demonstrated willingness and ability to work together wherever possible including
22 preparation of joint briefing and argument on Premera's objection to the Commissioner's
23 First Order: Case Management Order and joint briefing on the reply to Premera's
24 Opposition to Motions to Intervene. Hospital associations plan to continue these efforts
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1 wherever possible, including combined briefing and discovery, where appropriate. They
2 will endeavor to work not only with other provider groups but consumer and Alaska
3 groups as well. However, for the reasons cited above, these efforts at collaboration must
4 remain largely informal, allowing for proper representation of hospital association and
5 other applicant-intervenors' interests and avoiding potential violations of the Rules of
6 Professional Conduct.
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9 Respectfully submitted this 18th day of December, 2002.

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